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Abstract 
In line with previous literature this paper finds that strict employment protection legislation has 
a negative impact on the volume of inward Foreign Direct Investment. Rigid labor markets 
result in high adjustment and exit costs which deter foreign investments. We also find that the 
deterrent effect of inflexible labor markets is larger for industries with relatively high shares of 
low-skilled workers employed. Our findings are consistent with the view that governments can 
support structural change by tightening labor market regulations which especially deters 
inflows of FDI into low-skill industries. To avoid a drop in high-skill FDI host countries should 
simultaneously improve other location factors especially relevant for the latter. 
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A flexible labor market with low levels of employment protection is commonly perceived to provide an 
environment conducive to investment, employment and structural change. Many countries have therefore 
increased the flexibility of their labour markets during the past decades. An important element in the 
flexibilization of the labor markets is the degree of employment protection legislation. Employment 
protection encompasses regulations, either legislated or written in labor contracts that limit the employer’s 
ability to hire or fire workers without delay or cost 
 
Frequently, a positive relationship between labor market flexibility, a low degree of employment protection 
legislation, and Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) attraction has been proposed. This positive relationship is 
based on the view that strict employment protection legislation imposes exit costs for firms which - ceteris 
paribus - hamper inward FDI due to a reduction of an investment’s profitability. 
It is conceivable that higher exit costs due to strict employment protection legislation might be of particular 
relevance for FDI in industries which are highly mobile and less committed to a particular host location. 
Such industries, often termed “footloose industries”, are especially sensitive to changing comparative 
advantage or changes in production cost. High exit costs prevent these industries from adjusting to such 
changes. These industries continuously seek for low labor cost locations and employ a rather large share 
of low skilled workers. Thus, it is likely that the negative impact of strict employment protection regulations 
on FDI inter alia depends on an industry’s skill intensity.  
The current study investigates the relationship between employment protection legislation and FDI in a 
panel of major host countries for inward FDI at the industry level. We add to the existing literature by 
testing the conditional hypothesis that the impact of strict employment protection legislation on FDI differs 
across industries due to differences in the skill composition of the workforce. Our prior expectation is that 
tight employment protection legislation will affect FDI more negatively in mobile industries with a higher 
share of low-skilled employment due to the greater importance of exit costs. 
The sample used in this panel econometric study includes ten manufacturing sectors in 11 host countries 
for FDI for the period 1995-2005 and controls for a large number of determinants of FDI. In line with 
previous literature this paper finds that employment protection legislation, especially regulations towards 
regular employment, has a negative impact on the volume of inward Foreign Direct Investment. Yet, we 
also find that the deterrent effect of inflexible labor markets is predominately given for industries with 
relatively high shares of low skilled workers employed. This result is consistent with the view that high exit 
costs due to strict employment protection legislation matters particularly for mobile industries like the 
textile, food and wood industries which continuously seek for low labor cost locations. 1 
 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
Jurisdictions try to attract Foreign Direct  Investment (FDI) by offering favorable location 
factors distinguishing them from competitor countries. A vast empirical literature exploring 
the determinants of FDI has emerged (e.g. Fontagné and Mayer 2005 for an overview). The 
results generally imply that both, market- and cost-factors matter for FDI attraction. Within 
the  group  of  cost-factors  labor-related  costs  are  important.  Costs  of  this  type  not  only 
comprise directly measureable factors like wage costs (i.e. compensation to employees and 
social security contributions) but also more indirect costs stemming from the inflexibility of 
labor markets. Inflexibility of the labor markets creates costs for Multinational Enterprises 
(MNEs), since it might prevent profit maximizing adjustment of the labor force in the short-
run. 
Yet, although most FDI studies take wage costs into account, empirical studies exploring the 
relationship  between  labor  market  inflexibility  and  FDI  have  emerged  only  recently  (see 
section  2  for  an  overview).  This  empirical  literature  is  in  favor  of  a  negative  effect  of 
inflexible labor markets on FDI decisions of MNEs. Put differently, a positive relationship 
between  labor  market  flexibility  and  FDI  attraction  is  frequently  proposed.  This  positive 
relationship is based on the view that rigid labor markets impose adjustment and exit cost 
which  -  ceteris  paribus  -  hamper  inward  FDI  due  to  a  reduction  in  an  investment‟s 
profitability (see Haaland et al. 2003; Nicoletti et al. 2003).
1 
The mechanisms in which exit costs in form of labor market rigidities affect the location and 
scale of FDI have been formally modeled by Haaland et al. (2003) based on the assumption of 
an uncertain environment. Moreover, the studies of Görg (2005) and Dewitt et al. (2009) 
explore the presence of amplifying effects of a country‟s riskiness and investment costs on the 
FDI impact of rigid labor markets. 
However, it is conceivable that the negative impact of high adjustment and exit costs due to 
rigid  labor  markets  on  FDI  is  amplified  by  a  host  location‟s  low-skill  intensity:  High 
adjustment  and  exit  costs  in  form  of  rigid  labor  markets  prevent  firms  from  reacting  to 
changes in comparative advantage and location factors. As the supply of low-skilled labor is 
                                                 
1 It has to be stressed that another argument -theoretically established and empirically tested by Dewitt et al. 
(2009) - relates to domestic anchorage, i.e. the decision whether to engage in FDI. According to this argument, 
a  high  domestic  level  of  employment  protection  tends  to  discourage  outward  FDI  (anchoring  effect  of 
employment protection legislation). This is, however, not the argument here. We are rather concerned with 
“pull effects” of lax employment protection legislation due to low adjustment and exit costs. 2 
 
abundant compared to that of high-skilled labor
2 it is likely that FDI into low-skill intensive 
industries is  more sensitive to  such changes in comparative advantage or location factors. 
Therefore high adjustment and exit costs might be of greater relevance for MNEs undertaking 
FDI in low-skill industries leading to a larger negative impact of rigid labor markets on FDI 
into low-skill intensive industries.
3 On the contrary, high-skilled labor is relatively scarce and 
thus  higher  search  costs  imply  a  lower  sensitivity  of  FDI  into  high -skill  industries  to 
alterations in the locational quality. 
Although the inflexibility of the labor market can arise from various labor market institutions 
we focus in this paper on a country‟s employment protection legislation which is the central 
part of the legal stipulations towards the labor market.
4 Employment protection encompasses 
regulations, either legislated or written  in labor contracts that limit the employer‟s ability to 
hire or fire workers without delay or cost (Pissarides 2001; OECD 2004).  
Labor standards and employment protection legislation in particular are largely in the realm of 
nation  states.  Thus,  employment  protection  legislation  is  an  instrument  which  allows 
jurisdictions to compete for FDI. Moreover, countries typically differ in their preferences for 
labor standards. Table 1a shows the level of employment protection legislation in selected 
OECD / EU countries
5, based on the overall summary index (version 1) developed by the 
OECD (see OECD 1999 and 2004). This index captures regulations towards both, regular and 
temporary employment. The index ranges from zero (very low labor market protection) to 6 
(very high labor market protection). 
   
                                                 
2 Low skilled (untrained) labor is frequently described as a type of a location’s “natural asset” – in contrast to 
more scarce “created assets” like skilled (trained) labor (see e.g. Dunning and Narula 1995). 
3 While in principle, low-skilled labor is employed within certain segments of every industry, it is also possible to 
differentiate between industries (see Peneder 2007 for a widely used industry classification) and rank them by 
their  skill  intensity.  Typical  examples  of  low-skill  intensive  industries  are  the  food,  textiles  and  the  wood 
industries. 
4 Besides employment protection legislation the trade union density and coverage, the level of wage bargaining 
and the taxation of labor income are frequently used to characterize the flexibility of labor markets. 
5 The choice of countries and years is dictated by data quality and quantity (see section 3 for additional details). 3 
 
Table 1a: Stringency of overall employment protection legislation in selected countries 
 
1995  1996  1997  1998  1999  2000  2001  2002  2003  2004  2005 
AUT  2.21  2.21  2.21  2.21  2.21  2.21  2.21  2.21  1.93  1.93  1.93 
CZE  1.90  1.90  1.90  1.90  1.90  1.90  1.90  1.90  1.90  1.90  1.90 
FIN  2.17  2.09  2.09  2.09  2.09  2.09  2.02  2.02  2.02  2.02  2.02 
FRA  2.98  2.98  2.98  2.98  2.98  2.98  3.05  3.05  3.05  3.05  3.05 
GER  3.09  3.09  2.46  2.46  2.46  2.46  2.46  2.35  2.35  2.21  2.21 
HUN  1.27  1.27  1.27  1.27  1.27  1.27  1.27  1.27  1.52  1.52  1.52 
NLD  2.73  2.73  2.73  2.73  2.12  2.12  2.12  2.12  2.12  2.12  2.12 
SVK  1.80  1.80  1.80  1.80  1.80  1.80  1.80  1.80  1.34  1.34  1.34 
SVN  2.90  2.90  2.90  2.90  2.90  2.90  2.90  2.90  2.50  2.50  2.50 
GBR  0.60  0.60  0.60  0.60  0.60  0.68  0.68  0.75  0.75  0.75  0.75 
USA  0.21  0.21  0.21  0.21  0.21  0.21  0.21  0.21  0.21  0.21  0.21 
 
The USA and GBR have the lowest labor market standards in force throughout the sample 
period. The strictest regulations are stipulated in FRA, GER and SVN. Table 1a shows that 6 
countries (AUT, FIN, GER, NLD, SVK, SVN) have substantially eased their employment 
protection legislation over time. Three countries (FRA, HUN and GBR) have increased and in 
two countries (CZE and USA) the index stays constant. Among the latter two groups are those 
countries which already had comparable lax employment protection legislation in force in 
1995 (i.e. HUN, GBR, USA).  
 
   4 
 
Table 1b: Stringency of employment protection legislation for regular employment  
 
1995  1996  1997  1998  1999  2000  2001  2002  2003  2004  2005 
AUT  2.92  2.92  2.92  2.92  2.92  2.92  2.92  2.92  2.37  2.37  2.37 
CZE  3.31  3.31  3.31  3.31  3.31  3.31  3.31  3.31  3.31  3.31  3.31 
FIN  2.47  2.31  2.31  2.31  2.31  2.31  2.17  2.17  2.17  2.17  2.17 
FRA  2.34  2.34  2.34  2.34  2.34  2.34  2.47  2.47  2.47  2.47  2.47 
GER  2.68  2.68  2.68  2.68  2.68  2.68  2.68  2.68  2.68  2.68  2.68 
HUN  1.92  1.92  1.92  1.92  1.92  1.92  1.92  1.92  1.92  1.92  1.92 
NLD  3.08  3.08  3.08  3.08  3.05  3.05  3.05  3.05  3.05  3.05  3.05 
SVK  2.47  2.47  2.47  2.47  2.47  2.47  2.47  2.47  2.31  2.31  2.31 
SVN  3.40  3.40  3.40  3.40  3.40  3.40  3.40  3.40  2.70  2.70  2.70 
GBR  0.95  0.95  0.95  0.95  0.95  1.12  1.12  1.12  1.12  1.12  1.12 
USA  0.17  0.17  0.17  0.17  0.17  0.17  0.17  0.17  0.17  0.17  0.17 
 
Tables 1b and 1c depict the developments of the sub -indices capturing regulations towards 
regular  and  temporary  employment.  Three  countries  (NLD,  SVK  and  SVN)  have  eased 
legislation for both types of employment. Interestingly, NLD and SVK have especially eased 
regulations towards temporary employment and SVN those towards regular employment. 
Two  countries  have  tightened  their  regulation  towards  temporary  employment  over  time 
(HUN  and  GBR)  and  the  index  for  regular  employment  has  soared  in  FRA  and  GBR. 
Furthermore, the tables show that GER has eased regulations towards temporary employment 
with unchanged regulations for regular employment and vice versa for AUT and FIN.  
 
   5 
 
Table 1c: Stringency of employment protection legislation for temporary employment  
 
1995  1996  1997  1998  1999  2000  2001  2002  2003  2004  2005 
AUT  1.50  1.50  1.50  1.50  1.50  1.50  1.50  1.50  1.50  1.50  1.50 
CZE  0.50  0.50  0.50  0.50  0.50  0.50  0.50  0.50  0.50  0.50  0.50 
FIN  1.88  1.88  1.88  1.88  1.88  1.88  1.88  1.88  1.88  1.88  1.88 
FRA  3.63  3.63  3.63  3.63  3.63  3.63  3.63  3.63  3.63  3.63  3.63 
GER  3.50  3.50  2.25  2.25  2.25  2.25  2.25  2.03  2.03  1.75  1.75 
HUN  0.63  0.63  0.63  0.63  0.63  0.63  0.63  0.63  1.13  1.13  1.13 
NLD  2.38  2.38  2.38  2.38  1.19  1.19  1.19  1.19  1.19  1.19  1.19 
SVK  1.13  1.13  1.13  1.13  1.13  1.13  1.13  1.13  0.38  0.38  0.38 
SVN  2.40  2.40  2.40  2.40  2.40  2.40  2.40  2.40  2.30  2.30  2.30 
GBR  0.25  0.25  0.25  0.25  0.25  0.25  0.25  0.38  0.38  0.38  0.38 
USA  0.25  0.25  0.25  0.25  0.25  0.25  0.25  0.25  0.25  0.25  0.25 
 
Taken together, Tables 1a-c signal that a wide  variety of levels of employment protection 
from  which  potential  foreign  investors  may  choose  exists.  Moreover  heterogeneous 
developments over time are given. 
Against this background the current study investigates the relationship between  rigid labor 
markets in form of strict employment protection legislation and FDI in a panel of major host 
countries for inward FDI-stock at the industry level. We add to the existing literature by 
testing the conditional hypothesis that the  negative impact of strict employment protection 
legislation on FDI differs across industries due to differences in the skill composition of the 
workforce. Our prior expectation is that the adverse effect of rigid labor markets on FDI is 
larger  in  industries  with  a  higher  share  of  low -skilled  employment  due  to  the  greater 
importance of adjustment and exit costs.  
In line with previous literature we find that employment  protection legislation, especially 
stipulations towards regular employment, has a negative impact on FDI. However, we also 
find evidence that the deterrent effect of inflexible labor markets is larger for industries with 
relatively high shares of low-skilled workers employed. 
The paper is structured as follows: Related empirical literature is summarized in section  II. 
Section  III.  describes the empirical  methodology  applied and the data  used. Section  IV.  
presents the results and section V. concludes.  
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II.  REVIEW OF RELATED EMPIRICAL LITERATURE 
This section briefly summarizes main features of related studies. Haaland et al. (2003) use 
firm level data on subsidiaries of Western MNEs located in the manufacturing sector in three 
Central and East European countries (CEECs) for the period 1994 to 1997 to test the validity 
of their theoretical exit cost model. They find that labor market flexibility, measured by the 
excess job reallocation rate has a significant negative impact on the FDI decisions of MNEs. 
Javorcik and Spatareanu (2005) study the importance of labor market characteristics using 
firm level data covering the period 1998 to 2001. Their sample includes firms from Western 
and Eastern European host countries of FDI. As proxies for labor market flexibility they use 
data from the Global Competitiveness Report as well as data compiled by Djankov et al. 
(2001). Overall, Javorcik and Spatareanu (2005) find that the higher the flexibility of the labor 
market in the host country the more MNEs invest in the country. 
Görg (2005) studies to what extent labor market regulations matter for the location of US 
outward FDI-stocks in manufacturing in 33 host countries over the period 1986 to 1996. The 
analysis is based on data from the Global Competitiveness Report to proxy labor market 
flexibility. Görg (2005) concludes that tight labor market regulation has a negative impact on 
FDI location decisions. Moreover, Görg (2005) explores whether the riskiness of a country 
amplifies the negative effect of tight labor market regulations as argued by Haaland et al. 
(2003). Yet, he does not find any amplifying effect. 
Benassy-Quéré  et  al  (2007a)  apply  a  gravity  model  framework  to  analyze  the  impact  of 
institutions in a broad sense on FDI. They relate bilateral FDI-stocks to various institutional 
variables for a broad range of countries, mainly developing countries. Among the variables 
analyzed, three measures for the degree of labor market regulation are included. These proxies 
are taken from the Fraser Institute database and the Institutional Profile database of the French 
Ministry of Finance. For two of these three variables Benassy-Quéré et al (2007a) find a 
significant  negative impact  on FDI. However, the coefficient  of the third variable, which 
proxies the regulation of the labor market, enters insignificantly in their empirical model. 
Overall, however, they conclude that labor market rigidity has an adverse effect on FDI. 
Benassy-Quéré et al (2007b) analyze sector-level data on US outward  FDI-stocks for the 
period 1994 to 2002 in 18 Western and Eastern European countries. They also use data from 
the Fraser Institute as proxies for labor market flexibility and find only weak evidence for a 7 
 
significant impact of labor market flexibility on FDI. Their proxy for labor market flexibility 
is significant only in a few cases and in these cases it enters with a positive coefficient.  
Radulescu and Robson (2008) explain FDI-flows and also find support for the hypothesis that 
the strictness of employment protection legislation has a negative effect on FDI. They base 
their analysis on a sample of 19 OECD countries for the period 1975-1997. Their proxy for 
stringency  of  employment  protection  legislation  is  based  on  the  Blanchard  and  Wolfers 
(2000) index. 
Gross and Ryan (2008) find that employment protection matters in the foreign location choice 
of  Japanese  investors.  There  is  a  clear  negative  impact  from  strict  legislation  of  regular 
employment on FDI-related employment size while the impact of the legislation on temporary 
employment is much weaker. They use the OECD index in their analysis. 
Another study also applying the OECD index is Leibrecht and Scharler (2009). These authors 
use a panel of bilateral FDI-flows to seven CEECs over the period 1995-2004 and find that 
tight employment protection legislation does not exert a statistically significant impact on FDI 
once a proxy for unit labor costs is included in their empirical model. They conclude that the 
labor markets in the CEECs are not rigid enough to impose sizable exit costs. They argue that 
the low level of employment protection is also due to the still weak enforcement of labor laws 
in CEECs.  
Finally, Dewitt et al. (2009) provide estimates for the impact of differences in employment 
protection  legislation  between  home  and  host  countries  of  FDI.  Based  on  an  analysis  of 
bilateral outward FDI-stocks of OECD countries for the period from 1986 to 1995 they find a 
negative impact of an increasing employment protection legislation differential between home 
and host country. They apply the same measure for labor market flexibility as Görg (2005) as 
well as the  OECD index for employment protection  stringency. Dewitt et al. (2009) also 
explore  whether  the  negative  impact  of  an  increasing  employment  protection  legislation 
differential is amplified by an increase in the level of investment costs (cost of capital index). 
However, they do not find such an amplifying effect. 
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III.  EMPIRICAL MODEL AND METHODOLOGY, VARIABLES AND DATA ISSUES 
1.  Empirical Model and Methodology 
The current study is based on inward FDI-stocks in industrial sectors. The empirical model 
relates the logarithm of the inward FDI-stock of country i and industry j in year t to a set of 
location factors: 
 
          (1) 
 
The matrix   contains FDI-relevant location factors which vary over countries and over time 
and  includes  variables varying over time and over country-industry pairs. The former 
reflect the economic environment which is the same across all industries, while the latter 
group of variables reflects specific industry conditions. The former matrix includes different 
proxies for a host country‟s level of employment protection legislation (henceforth  ). 
The latter matrix contains a variable (henceforth  ) signaling the low-skill intensity of a 
particular industrial sector-country pair. Note, the variables contained in matrices   and   
are specified in logs (to reduce the impact of outliers) and enter in a one-year lagged form (to 
consider that contemporary FDI reacts to certain information on location factors with a time 
lag  (see  Bevan  and  Estrin  2004)  and  to  account  to  some  degree  for  endogeneity  (see 
Wooldridge 2002)
6).  
 denotes a matrix of (T - 1) time dummies and  are (n - 1) country-industry-pair-specific 
fixed effects capturing the impact of time -invariant country, industry and country -industry 
factors.  is the remainder error term. 
To test the hypothesis that the effect of strict employment protection legislation on FDI differs 
across industries due to differences in the skill composition of the workforce  we include an 
interaction term between   and   in the empirical model. The vector   captures this 
interaction effect.  
The use of interaction terms is justified whenever conditional  hypotheses are tested (e.g. 
Brambor et al. 2006).
 Including an interaction effect in our empirical model allows us to 
                                                 
6  Note,  to  explore  the  importance  of  the  endogeneity  issue  we  also  apply  an  Arellano-Bond-type-GMM 
estimator as a robustness check (cf. Table 6). 9 
 
directly explore the impact of   on   at various levels of  .
7 In particular, based 
on Equation 1 the effect of   on   is derived as follows: 
 
              (2) 
 
Equation 2  contains several important aspects for the interpretation of interaction models. 
First, it is evident that coefficients in interaction models (here   and  ) no longer show the 
marginal  effect of the variables entering the interaction effects. Specifically, c oefficient 
captures the effect of a change in   if  = 0. That is, this coefficient shows the 
impact of    if  only  higher  skilled workers are engaged in the production process. 
Thereby, one should bear in mind that   = 0 if   = 1%. Yet, the minimum value 
of   in our sample is about 4.3% and the mean value is  about 22%. Thus, the value of 
coefficient   is per se not meaningful. Rather, one needs to evaluate the marginal effect of 
 on FDI at different values of   multiplied by coefficient . Coefficient   signals 
how  the  marginal  impact  of  on  changes  if  more  low -skilled  workers  are 
employed.  
A second aspect concerns the statistical significance of coefficients in interaction models. 
Specifically, it is likely that   has a statistically significant impact on FDI at meaningful 
levels of   even if  ,   or both coefficients are not statistically different from zero (see 
Brambor et al. 2006 for details). To cope with this possibility we also present graphs showing 
not only the marginal effect of   on FDI at various levels of   but also its statistical 
significance (also see Wooldridge 2003, p. 194f on this issue). 
To reduce the possibility of an omitted variable bias and to explore the robustness of our 
results  to  inclusion  and  exclusion  of  variables  we  apply  a  “general-to-specific-approach” 
starting  with  the  most  general  model  (including  all  location  factors  considered),  the  full 
model, and testing down until only statistically significant variables remain. Note, that we 
generally conduct one-sided tests with the alternative hypothesis based on the expected sign 
of the coefficient (cf. Table 2). The significance of coefficients with an a priori ambiguous 
sign  is  based  on  two-sided  tests.  Standard  errors  are  calculated  using  a  non-parametric 
                                                 
7  To  model  conditional  hypotheses  via  interaction  effects  receives  increasing  attention  in  the  empirical 
literature. For instance, Dewitt et al. (2009) and Görg (2005) also use interactions effect in their analysis. 10 
 
bootstrap  approach  over  clusters  (country-industry-pairs)  and  are  thus  fully  robust  with 
respect to heteroscedasticity and serial correlation. 
 
2.  Variables and Data issues 
i.  Dependent variable:   
We use the inward FDI-stocks of 10 manufacturing sectors in millions of current Euro as 
dependent variable. The data is taken from Eurostat‟s New Cronos database and the wiiw 
Database on Foreign Direct Investment (for CEECs).  
 
ii.  Variables of main interest 
a.  Interaction between   and  :   
The interaction term is defined as the product of   times  . Given our prior 
expectations that tight employment protection legislation will affect FDI more negatively in 
low-skill intensive industries the coefficient of   should be negatively signed.  
 
b.  Employment protection legislation:   
We proxy the stringency of   with the indices developed and discussed in OECD (1999 
and 2004). For Slovenia the data are obtained from Leibrecht and Scharler (2009; Table 2). 
Three different   indices are used: an overall summary index (henceforth  ), a sub-
index for protection of regular workers ( ) and a sub-index for regulations towards 
temporary employment ( ). 
The methodology for calculating the three   indicators is detailed in OECD (2004) so we 
do not elaborate on this issue here. Yet, it is important to stress that we use version 1 of the 
 index. The OECD has also developed a version 2 index which captures regulations 
towards collective dismissals. However, due to lack of data we do not use the version 2 index 
in our analysis. Specifically, annual time series data for the version 1 index is available from 
1985-2008 whereas version 2 indices are available for most countries from 1998 onwards 11 
 
only. The version 1 index for   is calculated as unweighted average of the two sub-
indices, which are themselves based on a weighted average of different variables.
8 
Advantages  of  the  OECD  index  over  other  proxies  for  the  stringency  of  employment 
protection legislation are that it is available in panel data form; that it is derived on an 
internationally comparable basis and that sub -indices, isolating the importance of  different 
dimensions of labor market rigidity, are available.  
Given that a higher level of   (that is tighter employment protection regulations) implies 
higher adjustment and exit costs it should be negatively related with FDI independently of an 
industry‟s skill intensity (i.e a negative direct effect of   is expected). 
 
c.  Share of low-skilled workers employed:   
The share of low-skilled hours in total hours worked,  , is used as a proxy for the low-
skill intensity of an industry. Skill variables are frequently used independently of any   to 
disentangle  the  underlying  motive  for  FDI;  i.e.  whether  it  is  vertically  or  horizontally 
motivated (e.g. Markusen and Maskus 2002; Davies 2008). In the first case the coefficient of 
 should be positive. In this case MNEs exploit differences in factor endowments. In 
the second case, the sign should be negative, as firms duplicate plants (e.g. Barba Navaretti 
and  Venables  2004,  Chap.  2).  Thus,  in  principle  the  sign  of  the    coefficient  is 
indeterminate a priori. However, the majority of empirical studies finds that FDI is more 
horizontally than vertically  motivated, especially in  case of OECD countries  (e.g. Davies 
2008; Bloningen et al. 2003). Thus, we expect the coefficient of   to carry a negative 
sign. Data is taken from the EUKLEMS database.  
 
iii. Control variables 
The choice of control variables included in matrices   and   is done with a focus on FDI 
theories (see Faeth 2009 for an overview). However, FDI theories provide only a rough guide 
for the choice of control variables. Therefore we base our selection of these variables mainly 
on related empirical studies (e.g. Markusen and Maskus 2002; Görg 2005; Benassy- Quéré et 
al. 2007a, b).  
                                                 
8 Note that for Slovenia the available   follows the version 2 index. However, as the version 1 index is the 
simple unweighted average of   and   an unweighted average of these two variables is used as 
 in case of Slovenia. 12 
 
Specifically, we include a proxy for market  size ( ), GDP per capita ( ), the 
average effective tax rate on corporate profits ( ), public R&D expenditures as percent 
of GDP ( ), the political risk level ( ), the macroeconomic risk level ( ), the 
information and communication (ICT) infrastructure endowment ( ), and the level of legal 
barriers to FDI ( ) in the matrix  . Control variables entering  are labor costs 
( ) and labor productivity ( ).  
Variable   captures market size, and is expected to be positively correlated with FDI. The 
sign of the coefficient of   might be considered as ambiguous a priori (e.g. Benassy-
Quéré et al. 2007a), pointing towards its role as a „„catch-all‟‟ variable: On the one hand it 
might represent effects  of labor costs on production costs (e.g. Mutti and Grubert 2004), 
implying a negatively signed coefficient. On the other hand, it captures positive effects on an 
FDI‟s profit level via a favorable infrastructure endowment (e.g. Mutti 2004), a country‟s 
purchasing power and labor productivity (e.g. Mutti and Grubert 2004), as well as better 
institutions and less economic and political risk (e.g. Benassy-Quéré et al. 2007a). 
As  we  include  most  of  these  underlying  variables  in  our  model    is  intended  to 
capture  FDI  effects  of  an  increasing  purchasing  power  in  our  application  (also  see  Görg 
2005). Thus, a positively signed coefficient is expected. 
Labor  costs  partly  reflect  to  what  extent  FDI  location  decisions  are  driven  by  efficiency 
considerations.  An increase in  ,  ceteris  paribus, increases  production costs. We 
therefore expect a negatively signed coefficient. In addition, an increase in   should 
impact positively on FDI, not least via its favorable impact on unit production costs.  
The change in the consumer price index,  , is used as a proxy for macroeconomic risk as a 
high  inflation  rate  indicates  macroeconomic  uncertainty  which  deters  FDI.  Yet,  as  our 
endogenous variable is measured in nominal terms higher inflation rates might also have a 
positive  impact  on  the  volume  of  FDI  (Buch  and  Lipponer  2007).  Thus  the  sign  of  this 
variable‟s coefficient is ambiguous a priori. 
Similarly to  a higher level of political risk,  , should impact negatively on FDI. Yet, 
due to the particular definition of the measure of   used we expect a positively signed 
coefficient. The variable   is intended to capture legal barriers to inward FDI. Legal 
barriers to FDI are lower the higher the score of  . Thus, we expect a positive sign for 
this variable. 13 
 
The variable   is a summary measure for the taxation of FDI proceeds capturing both, 
the tax burden on a very profitable as well as on a marginal investment. More specifically, the 
after-tax profit from FDI is directly determined by the average tax rate (see Devereux and 
Griffith 1998a). A higher   implies lower after-tax profits and thus lower incentives to 
invest in a particular location. Thus, a negatively signed coefficient is expected.  
As an increasing part of FDI constitutes R&D related activities (see e.g. Guimón 2009) a high 
level of public expenditures on R&D should be relevant for an MNE‟s location decision. 
Specifically, a country‟s R&D level can be considered as a type of public good with positive 
spill-over effects on firms. These in turn increase productivity without causing additional 
costs and lead to a higher profitability of an investment. Thus, an increase in the public R&D 
expenditures in GDP ( ) should have a positive impact on FDI. 
A country‟s endowment with material infrastructure is generally considered to have a positive 
impact on FDI. Thereby a favorable endowment with ICT-infrastructure has been frequently 
shown to be particularly relevant for FDI attraction (e.g. Bellak et al. 2009; Mollick et al. 
2006). Therefore we include a variable,  , capturing a country‟s endowment with ICT-
infrastructure in the empirical model. However, it should be stressed, that other FDI relevant 
infrastructure  components,  like  the  transport  or  the  power  generation  infrastructure,  are 
captured to some extent by  . Moreover, as these infrastructure components are only 
slowly evolving over time, they also might be captured by the country-industry-specific fixed 
effects,  , included in our empirical model.  
 
iv. Data Issues 
Our sample includes the countries listed in Tables 1a-c for the period 1995-2005 and in 10 
industrial sectors DA, DB, DD/DE, DG, DH, DJ – DM (Nace Revision 1 classification).
9 
Focusing on inward FDI-stock to the manufacturing sector implies that substantial shares of 
employment and of gross fixed capital formation in the host  countries are covered by our 
analysis: The  minimum  share in domestic employment  (in manufacturing sector national 
total
10) is 6% in GER in 1998 and the maximum share is 44% in SVK in 2005; the minimum 
                                                 
9  Industries  DA,  DB,  DD/DE  are  typical  examples  of  industries  employing  rather  high  shares  of  low-skilled 
workers.  The  mean  values  of    (1995-2005)  are  25%,  25%  and  41%.  In  the  other  industries  the 





share in domestic gross fixed capital formation is 6.5% in FIN and the maximum share is 70% 
in HUN and NLD in 2005.  
The  choice  of  years  and  countries  is  predominantly  driven  by  data  issues.  FDI  and 
EUKLEMS data was available until 2005 and data from the EUKLEMS database is only 
available from 1995 onwards for a couple of countries. FDI data at the industrial level have 
many missing values for a range of countries (e.g. Greece, Japan, Portugal and Switzerland). 
Moreover data on several exogenous variables are lacking for some countries. Especially data 
on   was available at an internationally comparable basis only for the countries included 
plus Italy, Poland, Romania, Bulgaria and Croatia. However, these countries are excluded for 
the following reasons: Data on   for Italy is questionable as rather low percentages of 
low-skilled workers employed are shown in the EUKLEMS database for this country; Poland 
is an “outlier” in the type of FDI received -most FDI is going into the primary and the tertiary 
sector; EUKLEMS data are not available for Romania, Bulgaria and Croatia.  
Table 2 summarizes the above discussions with respect to the variables used also including 
the  rationale  behind  these  variables.  It  provides  the  expected  sign  of  the  estimated 
coefficients,  the  data  sources  used  and  a  detailed  description  of  the  measurement  and 
definition of the variables. Note, that only for one variable the expected sign is ambiguous a 
priori ( ). Table 3 includes some descriptive statistics for the variables used in the analysis 
and  Table  4  shows  their  pairwise  correlations.  Some  correlations  are  rather  pronounced, 
especially  those  with    which  is  consistent  with  the  “catch  all”  character  of  this 
variable.  We  check  the  sensitivity  of  the  results  to  this  correlation  in  our  estimations  by 
excluding   in one specification (see Table 6, M2). 
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Table 2: Variable rationale, variable description and summary statistics  
Variable  Rationale 
Exp. 
Sign 
Definition  Source 
  Endogenous variable.   
Inward FDI-stock of 10 manufacturing 
sectors in mn of current Euro 
Eurostat‟s New Cronos database and wiiw Database on FDI 
(for CEECs) 
 
Larger markets should experience more 
inward FDI. Opportunities to generate profits 
are higher. 
+ 
Own market potential; calculated as 
follows: 
POT = (GDP / internal distance) 
GDP in mn of current Euro 




Captures positive effects of higher 
purchasing power on FDI. 
+  GDP per capita in Euro15-PPP  Eurostat‟s New Cronos database 
 
A higher effective tax rate should decrease 
inward FDI, since it directly impacts 
negatively on the after-tax profit level of an 
FDI. 
–  Effective average tax rate (in percent) 
Own calculations based on Devereux and Griffith 1998b; 
assumptions follow Devereux and Griffith as well as the IFS 
data available under 
http://www.ifs.org.uk/publications.php?publication_id=3210; 
raw tax data are taken from the European Tax Handbook and 
KPMG‟s Corporate Tax Rate Surveys 
 
Higher R&D expenditures in GDP should 
encourage inward FDI due to knowledge 
spill-over effects. 
+ 
Government-financed expenditures on 
R&D in percent of GDP 
OECD‟s Main Science and Technology Indicators database 
 
Higher legal barriers towards FDI directly 
imply less inward FDI. 
+ 
index ranges from 0 – 100 higher value 
means less restrictions 
The Heritage Foundation 
http://www.heritage.org/index/faq.aspx 
  Depending on the motive of FDI, this  –  Share of low-skilled employees in total  EUKLEMS database 16 
 
Variable  Rationale 
Exp. 
Sign 
Definition  Source 
variable signals either higher incentives to 
fragment production (vertical FDI) or lower 
possibilities to duplicate plants (horizontal 




Higher labor costs imply higher production 
costs and thus lower FDI. 
– 
Compensation of employees (in millions 




Higher labor productivity attracts FDI via its 
favorable effect on production costs. 
+ 





Larger ICT-infrastructure endowment lowers 
production costs and thus increases FDI. 
+ 
Sum of telephone mainlines, mobile 
phone subscribers, internet connections 
and personal computers per 1000 
inhabitants 
World Banks‟s World Development Indicators database 
 *
 
Tighter employment protection legislation 
increases adjustment and exit costs. 
– 
Indicators of the strictness of 
employment protection legislation 
(version 1) 
Scale: 0-6 with higher scores 
representing stricter regulation 
OECD‟s Labor market statistics database; 
www.oecd.org/employment/protection; for SVN source is 
Leibrecht and Scharler (2009) Table 2 
** 
 
Stricter employment protection legislation 
matters particularly for industries with a large 
share of low-skilled workers employed. 
– 
Interaction effect between  
 and the different types of  * 
 
See sources for   and   17 
 
Variable  Rationale 
Exp. 
Sign 
Definition  Source 
 
 
Politically riskier countries should receive 
less inward FDI due to higher uncertainty and 
larger possibilities of expropriation. 
 
+***  Political risk ( 0 = high; 25 = low)  Euromoney 
 
Riskier countries should receive less inward 
FDI due higher uncertainty; Yet one has to 
bear in mind that the endogenous variable is 
denominated in nominal terms. 
?  Change in consumer price index  Eurostat‟s New Cronos database 
Notes: *   captures all three proxies for employment protection legislation used in the analysis; ** interaction term of   with each of the three indices contained in  ; 




Table 3: Descriptive Statistics 
Variable 
 
Mean  Std. Dev.  Min  Max 








0.61  3.68  10.22 








0.18  7.04  7.96 








0.14  9.57  10.13 








0.45  6.20  8.12 








0.10  2.72  3.54 








0.10  -0.82  -0.21 








0.19  1.90  3.24 








0.19  2.22  4.21 








0.12  2.45  3.22 








0.08  0.21  0.64 








0.05  0.44  0.72 









0.21  -0.81  0.51 








0.06  2.72  3.27 








0.10  3.78  4.49 








0.46  -1.20  1.95 
N =    1016  n =     108  T-bar = 9.4 
     
Note: For convenience time, country and industry identifier not included. 
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Table 4: Correlation Matrix 
 
lnPot  lnGdpcap  lnIct  lnEatr  lnGovgerd  lnLabcost  lnLabprod  lnHLS  lnEplov  lnEplreg  lnEpltemp  lnRisk  lnFreefdi  lnCpi 
lnPot  1.00 
                         
lnGdpcap  0.82  1.00 
                       
lnIct  0.52  0.80  1.00 
                     
lnEatr  0.50  0.32  -0.07  1.00 
                   
lnGovgerd  0.66  0.78  0.47  0.30  1.00 
                 
lnLabcost  0.82  0.89  0.64  0.31  0.80  1.00 
               
lnLabprod  0.55  0.63  0.48  0.27  0.51  0.80  1.00 
             
lnHLS  0.14  0.17  0.04  -0.15  0.44  0.23  0.00  1.00 
           
lnEplov  -0.31  -0.28  -0.19  -0.12  -0.01  -0.13  -0.15  0.29  1.00 
         
lnEplreg  -0.41  -0.40  -0.24  -0.19  -0.21  -0.28  -0.25  0.18  0.95  1.00 
       
lnEpltemp  -0.08  -0.02  -0.06  0.00  0.32  0.16  0.05  0.44  0.85  0.67  1.00 
     
lnRisk  0.85  0.91  0.64  0.30  0.82  0.90  0.60  0.28  -0.20  -0.31  0.04  1.00 
   
lnFreefdi  0.35  0.33  0.35  0.25  0.09  0.27  0.25  -0.21  -0.26  -0.15  -0.36  0.39  1.00 
 
lnCpi  -0.65  -0.70  -0.49  -0.41  -0.69  -0.74  -0.47  -0.25  0.00  0.10  -0.16  -0.77  -0.29  1.00 





IV.  RESULTS 
We start by commenting briefly on the control variables. The remainder of the results section 
is organized by the three types of  . 
 
1.  Control variables 
Table 6 (M1 and M4) shows that we control for many different cost- and market-related 
determinants of FDI. In particular, Table 6 implies that the countries in our sample are host 
countries of FDI where (i) political and macroeconomic risk does not play a role; where (ii) 
relevant restrictions on FDI hardly exist anymore and where (iii) FDI are not productivity 
driven, but primarily labor cost driven. FDI directed to these countries reacts significantly 
positive to an increase in market size and purchasing power, as well as to an improvement of 
ICT-infrastructure and significantly negative to an increase in labor costs and taxes. These 
results are not implausible when compared to related empirical literature on the determinants 
of  FDI  (e.g.  Bevan  and  Estrin,  2004).  Moreover,  the  coefficients,  which  all  represent 
elasticities,  are  of  an  economically  meaningful  size.  Note,  that  Model  (M1)  includes  the 
variable  , which due to its nature described above, may partly reflect other location 
factors included, e.g. infrastructure endowment or the risk level. Therefore, we re-estimate 
(M1) by excluding  . (M2) shows that dropping   changes only little. 
 
2.  Variables of main interest 
Starting with   Table 6  suggests that strict  employment protection has a direct, not 
interacted, negative effect on inward FDI-stock (see M1-M3).
11 The size of the coefficient on 
 (M1 -0.48 and similar sizes of coefficients in M2 and M3) implies that a 1% increase 
in the index of employment protection would lead to an almost 0.5% reduction in inward FDI-
stocks. These results are consistent with the findings of prior empirical literature (see section 
2).
 12 
Before we turn to the interaction effect, a few words on the second variable which constitutes 
the  interaction  effect,  i.e.  ,  are  in  order.  Referring  to  Table  6  (M1-M5)   
                                                 
11 Note that model (M1) contains the full set of controls variables whereas stepwise exclusion of statistically 
insignificant variables leads to our preferred specifications (M3 and M5). 
12 For model (M3) the results of a bootstrapped Hausman-test (HT) is reported which shows that the H0 (i.e. 
Random Effects assumptions are valid) is rejected. 22 
 
consistently carries a negative sign with an elasticity of 0.4-0.5. The negative sign points to 
the prevalence of horizontal FDI where firms duplicate their domestic activities abroad. This 
finding is plausible as the host countries included in our sample receive most of inward FDI 
from countries of similar level of development.
13 
The interaction effect,  , shows a  negatively signed coefficient which is also statistically 
significant. Moreover, the F-test reported in Table 6 (M4 and M5) signals that the coefficients 
for    and    are  jointly  statistically  significant  different  from  zero  at  the  5% 
significance level, which underpins the effects derived. These results are consistent with the 
view that the impact of strict employment protection indeed  increases with the share of low-
skilled workers employed.  
Note, that the coefficient on   carries an unexpected positive sign in models (M4) and 
(M5). However, this coefficient shows the effect of a change in   if   = 1%. As 
already noted this value of   is not included in our sample. Moreover, as stressed by 
Kennedy (2005; example 8) it is not unusual that one of the interacting variables carries the 
“wrong” sign, with  the  model nevertheless showing the  expected marginal effects  over a 
meaningful range of sample values (cf. Figure 1). 
As already stressed the marginal effect of   cannot be taken directly from the values 
given in Table 6 but needs to be calculated according to Equation 2 with changing values of 
. For instance, evaluated at the mean value of   of about 2.95 the coefficients 
given in model (M5) imply that a 1% increase in   would lead to a decrease in FDI by 
about 0.5%.
14 More generally, Figure 1 displays size and significance of the marginal effect of 
 across the range of sample values of  . The effect is significantly negative in a 
statistical sense  when   is about 2.75 or above. In other words,  about two-thirds of 
observations are in the region of  significance. Moreover, the effect never turns positively 
significant.  
Finally,  as  a  robustness  check,  models  (M3_ GMM)  and  (M5_GMM )  show  results  for 
,   and   entering contemporaneously into matrices   and  , respectively. 
Endogeneity is mitigated by using two-years and higher lagged values  of these variables as 
instruments within an Arellano-Bond-type First Difference estimator. Moreover, the appendix 
to  the  paper  contains  a  Figure  A1  which  is  similar  to  Figure  1  but  based  on  model 
                                                 
13 Even the CEECs included in our sample are among the highest developed transition countries.  
14 Calculated according to Equation 2 as 1.22-0.58*2.95. 23 
 
(M5_GMM).  Models  (M3_GMM)  and  (M5_GMM)  as  well  as  Figure  A1  imply  that  our 
results remain qualitatively unchanged.
 15 Thus, taken together our results suggest that a high 
value  of    deters  FDI  in  general  and  in  industries  with  high  shares  of  low-skilled 
workers employed in particular.  
 
Table 6: Results for   
 
M1  M2  M3  M4  M5  M3_GMM  M5_GMM 
lnPot  1.21*  1.77***  1.15*  1.49**  1.49**  0.60*  0.97*** 
 
(1.44)  (2.16)  (1.38)  (1.67)  (1.71)  (1.59)  (2.47) 




(2.11)  (1.95)  (2.08)  (1.84)  (2.09) 
lnIct  0.71**  0.96***  0.76**  0.63**  0.66*  0.63***  0.54*** 
 
(1.80)  (2.65)  (1.88)  (1.72)  (1.61)  (2.50)  (2.34) 
lnEatr  -1.15***  -0.89***  -1.14***  -1.25***  -1.25***  -0.67**  -0.92*** 
 
(-2.90)  (-2.47)  (-3.10)  (-3.17)  (-3.20)  (-2.37)  (-3.48) 
lnLabcost  -1.31*  -1.55**  -1.21*  -1.27*  -1.22*  -0.41*  -0.57** 
 
(-1.55)  (-1.78)  (-1.45)  (-1.48)  (-1.45)  (-1.56)  (-1.93) 
lnGovgerd  0.48***  0.35*  0.49**  0.48***  0.47***  0.26*  0.28* 
 
(2.04)  (1.49)  (1.95)  (2.01)  (2.06)  (1.49)  (1.52) 
lnHLS  -0.48*  -0.50*  -0.47*  -0.26  -0.24  -0.80*  -0.31 
 
(-1.50)  (-1.54)  (-1.55)  (-0.75)  (-0.74)  (-1.55)  (-0.64) 
lnEplov  -0.48**  -0.41*  -0.49**  1.12  1.22  -1.32***  -0.37 
 
(-1.71)  (-1.49)  (-1.79)  (1.20)  (1.44)  (-3.42)  (0.32) 
lnRisk  0.13  0.62  ns  0.03  ns  ns  ns 
 
(0.23)  (1.04) 
 
(0.05) 
     
lnFreefdi  0.15  0.10  ns  0.15  ns  ns  ns 
 
(0.69)  (0.46) 
 
(0.74) 
     
lnLabprod  0.002  0.05  ns  -0.01  ns  ns  ns 
 
(0.01)  (0.25) 
 
(-0.06) 
     
lnCpi  -0.044  -0.03  ns  -0.03  ns  ns  ns 
 
(-1.03)  (-0.81) 
 
(-0.71) 
     
I (interaction term)  not included  not included  not included  -0.55**  -0.58***  not 
included  -0.25 
       
(-1.78)  (-2.03)    (-0.66) 
Obs  1006  1006  1016  1006  1016  898  898 
                                                 
15 Estimations are carried out using Stata 10.1. GMM estimation is based on Rodman’s (2009) xtabond2 
command. 24 
 
Cluster  108  108  108  108  108  108  108 
R^2 overall  0.62  0.61  0.63  0.62  0.62     
TD (p-value)  0.004  0.021  0.001  0.002  0.001  0.001  0.003 
F-test (p-value) 
     
0.048  0.033    0.001 
HT (p-value) 
   
0.000 
   
   
OV (p-value)            0.113  0.549 
Number of IV            67  116 
AR(2) (p-value)            0.141  0.116 
AR(1) (p-value)            0.010  0.006 
Notes:  For  convenience  time,  country  and  industry  identifier  not  included;  t-values  based  on  bootstrapped 
standard errors in parenthesis except in case of GMM models; in these cases z-statistics are based on robust one-
step GMM standard errors; ns = not significant and therefore excluded; TD = Test on joint significance of time 
dummies; F-test is test on joint significance of   and   (interaction term); in case of model (M3) HT 
is for the bootstrapped Hausman-test for Random vs. Fixed Effects (see Cameron and Trivedi 2009, p. 429f); OV 
= Hansen-J-test on validity of instruments; AR() = Arellano-Bond-test for serial correlation; *** / ** / * = 
significant (one-sided test) at the 1% / 5% / 10% significance level. 
 
Figure 1: Impact of   on FDI as  changes 
 
Source: Based on Stata code made available by Thomas Brambor: 
http://homepages.nyu.edu/~mrg217/interaction.html#code 
 
As   is a summary index it might hide structural differences, which are revealed by the 
underlying sub-indices,   and  . Table 7 includes the results.  
Again starting with the model excluding the interaction effect (M6 as the preferred model), 
the  coefficient  on    is  statistically  significant  and  also  carries  a  negative  sign  like 25 
 
, but implying a substantially higher elasticity. Thus, strict regulations towards regular 
employment have a significant direct effect on inward FDI. 
Model (M7) in Table 7 shows the preferred specification with the interaction term included. 
Although none of the three coefficients of main interest is statistically significant this does not 
imply that no economically and statistically significant effect exists (cf. Figure 2) as outlined 
above  and  detailed  in  Brambor  et  al.  (2006).  Moreover,    and    are  jointly 
statistically different from zero.  
The marginal effect of   evaluated at the mean value of   is -1.11.
16 Thus, 
evaluated at the mean value of   the effect of   is larger than that of  . 
Turning to size and significance of the marginal effect of   over different values of 
, Figure 2 clearly shows that – similar to  – the marginal effect of   is 
significant  and  negative  for  the  majority  of  the  sample  values  of  .  Only  16%  of 




Figure 2: Impact of   as   changes 
 
 
                                                 
16 Calculated according to Equation 2 as -0.16 + (-0.32*2.95). 26 
 
The  third  indicator  of    used  in  the  analysis  is  .  In  marked  contrast  to  the 
previous  results,  the  coefficient  on    is  statistically  not  significant  and  has  a 
substantially lower elasticity close to zero. Thus, regulations towards temporary employment 
seem not to have any impact on FDI. This result is in line with Gross and Ryan (2008) who 
conclude that although the protection of regular employment exerts a harmful effect on FDI, 
regulation  with  respect  to  temporary  employment  has  a  much  weaker  impact.  More 
importantly,  this  result  is  not  unexpected  as  the  share  of  temporary  employment  in  total 
employment  remains  below  15%  in  the  countries  in  our  sample  (ILO  2008).  Thus,  the 
majority of labor contracts are on a regular basis.
17 This is consistent with  the finding of a 
larger effect of   than   on FDI. 
 
Table 7: Results for   and   
 
M6  M7  M8 
 
     
lnPot  1.22*  1.33**  1.07* 
 
(1.45)  (1.56)  (1.28) 
lnGdpcap  1.75***  1.64**  1.82*** 
 
(2.06)  (1.92)  (2.05) 
lnIct  0.68**  0.62*  0.79** 
 
(1.67)  (1.52)  (1.92) 
lnEatr  -1.37***  -1.37***  -1.18*** 
 
(-3.48)  (-3.48)  (-3.20) 
lnLabcost  -1.33*  -1.31*  -1.21* 
 
(-1.60)  (-1.55)  (-1.43) 
lnGovgerd  0.48***  0.47***  0.42** 
 
(2.08)  (2.03)  (1.84) 
lnHls  -0.48*  -0.25  -0.42* 
 
(-1.56)  (-0.70)  (-1.35) 
lnEplreg / lnEpltemp  -1.24***  -0.16  -0.07 
 
(-2.86)  (-0.14)  (-0.63) 
I (interaction term)  not included  -0.32  not included 
   
(-0.97) 
 
Obs  1016  1016  1016 
Cluster  108  108  108 
                                                 
17 According to ILO (2008) the incidence of temporary employment has tended to increase since the 1990ies, 
yet only marginally so in CEECs. 27 
 
R^2 overall  0.59  0.61  0.60 





HT (p-value)  0.000 
 
0.000 
Notes:  For  convenience  time,  country  and  industry  identifier  not  included;  t-values  based  on  bootstrapped 
standard  errors  in  parenthesis;  TD  =  Test  on  joint  significance  of  time  dummies;  F-test  is  test  on  joint 
significance of   and   (interaction term); HT = bootstrapped Hausman-test for Random vs. Fixed 





V.  CONCLUSIONS 
Summarizing,  for  a  country‟s  overall  regulations  towards  employment  protection  and  for 
regulations towards regular employment the results confirm our expectations: the rigidity of 
labor markets matters for inward FDI-stock and the deterrent effect is larger in industries with 
high  shares  of  low-skilled  workers  employed.  Yet,  for  regulations  towards  temporary 
employment no impact on FDI is established. This is, however, not implausible given the 
arguments in the related empirical literature discussed above and the descriptive evidence 
presented. 
Our findings suggest that governments can support structural change by tightening of labor 
market regulations. Such policies may lead to a change in the composition of manufacturing 
activities by deterring FDI into low-skill intensive sectors. Host country governments should 
simultaneously improve those location factors which are especially relevant for high-skill FDI 
(e.g. the economy‟s R&D intensity which is shown to have a positive impact on FDI). This 
has the potential to compensate investors into high-skill industries for higher labor-related 
costs and thus to stabilize the level of FDI into these sectors. Indeed, such policies have been 
used by several Asian countries (e.g. China, Taiwan, Singapore, Malaysia, South Korea) in 
order  to  climb  up  the  ladder  of  production  and  product  technologies  (see  e.g.  Asian 
Development Bank 2004). 
Finally, let us point out two aspects: First, one should bear in mind that the proxies for the 
degree of employment protection legislation used in this and earlier studies are often based on 
legal constraints that apply in host countries of FDI. Thus, they may not fully capture the 
degree  of  enforcement  of  employment  protection  across  countries  and  over  time.  This  is 
especially relevant in samples of heterogeneous countries as strict enforcement of labor laws 
needs  well  functioning  labor  tribunals.  For  example,  in  the  CEECs  the  enforcement  of 28 
 
employment protection legislation is weak due to the limited capacities of the courts and labor 
inspectorates (see Leibrecht and Scharler, 2009). 
Secondly, as most industries have segments of low- and high-skill activities, the sector view 
may be too broad (see Snower et al. 2009, p. 142) for analyzing the current issue. Yet, it is 
hoped that once more detailed micro-data become available, future research will be able to 
address this problem more thoroughly. 
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Appendix 
Figure A1: Impact of   on FDI as  changes based on model M5_GMM 
 